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Summary
Qualitative inquiry is a form of psychological research that seeks in-depth understanding of people and their social
worlds. Qualitative researchers typically study the experiences of people as meaning-making agents, relying on
verbal material. Qualitative inquiry has a long history in psychology, beginning in the 19th century with founders of
psychology like William James and Wilhelm Wundt. However, for much of the 20th century, qualitative inquiry has
occupied a marginal position in the discipline. This marginalization is best understood in relation to the discipline’s
early struggle to be regarded as legitimate. Adopting the methods of the natural sciences—notably quantification
and measurement—was a means to that end. Qualitative approaches, though suppressed for much of the 20th
century, were not entirely eliminated from the field. Personality theorists, for example, continued to make use of
them.
The 1970s marked the advent of new forms of qualitative inquiry in psychology, which drew from a variety of
intellectual and philosophical movements. These developments continued to gain acceptance and adherents.
Since the turn of the 20th century, national and international organizations of qualitative researchers in psychology
have been established. Venues for publishing qualitative research in psychology have increased. Nonetheless,
qualitative inquiry is still marginalized in many academic psychology departments, and training in qualitative
methods is seldom part of the methods curriculum.
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Introduction
Qualitative inquiry is a family of research approaches that seek in-depth understanding of people
and their social worlds. Qualitative approaches typically study the direct experiences of people as
meaning-making agents. Researchers usually make use of verbal material, such as talk or written
material (e.g., journals or letters); some researchers ask their research participants to produce
(and oftentimes then discuss) drawings, photos, or videos. Some researchers do not elicit
material directly from those they wish to study, but instead make use of “naturalistic” material,
such as conversations on telephone hotlines, postings on social media, or television or radio
broadcasts. Often the procedures for gathering material are used flexibly, enabling the researcher
to adapt them to individual participants. The material that is gathered is detailed, rich, and
complex. An example might be a set of life history narratives, each told in the participants’ own
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words. Another example might be a set of conversations collected through a series of focus
groups. Often, the ways of gathering material allow, and even encourage, the participants to bring
forward issues that were unanticipated by the researcher.
The family of qualitative research approaches contains many different approaches to analysis.
The type of analysis that a researcher chooses depends on the theoretical framework and the
questions under investigation. A common feature, though, is the aim to retain the complexity of
the material and the range of meanings expressed by the participants while seeking patterns
across the material. Some of the more common modes of analysis used by psychologists are:
various types of phenomenological analysis, life history or psychobiographical studies, various
forms of narrative analysis, grounded theory analysis, various discursive approaches, and the
critical incident technique.
The material presented in this article presumes that most readers have a basic knowledge of the
field of psychology but do not have extensive knowledge of qualitative research. Therefore, its
account of the history of qualitative inquiry is situated “inside” the history of the discipline in the
West. The article gives special attention to the way that the context afforded by the discipline of
psychology has shaped (and often constrained) the development of qualitative inquiry within
psychology. For historical accounts of qualitative inquiry in psychology that are written from
other perspectives, readers may wish to consult works by Brinkmann, Jacobsen, and Kristiansen
(2014), Jovanovic (2011), and Wertz (2014).
The article opens with several examples of psychological research using qualitative approaches,
moving from early projects to more contemporary ones. Next it turns to the historical
development of the discipline of psychology. This discussion begins with the early days of the
discipline in the late 19th century, as it developed in the wake of the growth of the natural
sciences. It describes especially the development of quantitative methods and measurement in
psychology and their rapid ascendance during this time period. This history provides the
backdrop against which the marginal position historically assigned to qualitative inquiry within
psychology must be understood.
Although qualitative approaches to psychology were disfavored in many subfields of psychology,
these approaches were never wholly expunged from the field. Throughout much of the 20th
century and into the present, workers in subfields of psychology concerned with personality
(sometimes called personology), adult development, psychotherapy, and counseling psychology
often made use of qualitative approaches. Of historic importance is the study of lives, a line of
research originating in the 1930s and continuing in this day. A key epistemological commitment
of psychologists working in the study of lives tradition was the focus on whole persons, who were
seen as having the capacity for reasoning, reflection, and self-knowledge. The next section takes
up the time period from the 1970s to the present—a time when diverse modes of qualitative
inquiry came to be used in psychology. Several of these approaches are described, along with the
philosophical systems and intellectual inspirations underlying them. The last part of the article
describes the situation in 2020—a time when qualitative inquiry is gaining increasing acceptance
among psychologists in many parts of the world.
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Qualitative Inquiry: Diverse Projects and Diverse Modes of Inquiry
Some brief examples illustrate the diversity of projects carried out by psychologists who have
espoused qualitative approaches. The set of examples begins with the early days of empirical
psychology near the end of the 19th century and then moves forward to the present. As the
examples illustrate, researchers have pursued a variety of knowledge interests and projects. As
the examples also illustrate, researchers have devised many ways of gathering material and many
approaches to analyzing or interpreting those materials.
Our first example is the large-scale scholarly investigation of religious experience carried out by
William James, who is often heralded as a founder of American psychology. James, who was
trained as a physician and was associated with Harvard University throughout his career, offered
the first psychology course in the United States in 1874. Unlike many of his counterparts, James
refused to view humans as mechanically responding to external stimuli. “I can,” he said, “put
myself into the sectarian scientist’s attitude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and
scientific laws may be all. But when I do, I hear … the word ‘Bosh!’ Humbug is humbug” (James,
1902, p. 509). James insisted that humans were intrinsically meaning-seeking subjects who
constantly engaged in reflective interactions with others. James’s The Varieties of Religious
Experience (1902) is a monumental example of qualitative inquiry. James sought to answer the
question “What is the nature, the constitution of religious experience?” and to understand the
“existential conditions” of religious experience (1902, p. 9). He devised an investigative approach
that gave primacy to personal and subjective experiences. Rather than arbitrarily limiting himself
to a single type of data, he amassed a corpus of letters, personal journals, diaries,
autobiographies, biographies, and personal conversations, ranging across many religious
traditions. He also drew upon his own experiences. Like many of today’s qualitative approaches,
James’s analysis began with close readings of the accounts he had gathered. He sought to identify
the characteristics constitutive of religious experiences in general as well as to identify the
distinctive characteristics that typified particular religious experiences, such as dramatic
conversions, mystical encounters, ecstatic visions, and saintliness. Though The Varieties of
Religious Experience is rarely read by psychologists today, it is still read and appreciated by
scholars outside psychology.
A second example is a project carried out in the 1930s by John Dollard, culminating in his book
Caste and Class in a Southern Town (1937). Dollard, who described himself as a Northerner and a
Yankee, took up residence in a small town in the southern United States in order to study
firsthand race relations during the Jim Crow era—the period that followed the post-Civil War
Reconstruction and the formal abolition of slavery. During the Jim Crow era, state and local laws
and customs held in place many forms of racial segregation and discriminatory treatment of
African Americans. Dollard (1937) especially sought to understand the affective aspects of race
relations, as well as the quotidian social and economic relations among the citizens of
Southerntown (the pseudonym he devised). Dollard relied on what is now called participant
observation. Deeming his project “sociological,” Dollard offered it as a model of “affectconscious social science” (1937, Chapter 2). Insofar as possible, he sought to immerse himself in
the ongoing social life of the town and to apprehend the patterned social relations of the people
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by taking part in their lives. In his words: “The primary research instrument would seem to be the
observing human intelligence trying to make sense out of the experience” (1937, p. 18). One
insight from his study was that although the lives of whites and blacks in Southerntown remained
quite segregated, large swaths of social and personal life—personal experiences, emotional set,
and status rankings—were intrinsically structured by a color-based caste system.
The third example is a project carried out in the 1980s. Two social psychologists, Margaret
Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992), studied quotidian expressions of racism among white
middle-class people in New Zealand. The researchers’ goal was to map the taken-for-granted
forms of explanation that ordinary people drew on to sustain and justify racist practices and
beliefs. They also wanted to observe how such forms of explanation were used in specific
contexts. They were further interested in how the particular historical and cultural context put in
place by New Zealand’s history of colonization came to be taken up as part of people’s beliefs,
thoughts, and expressions. Wetherell and Potter conducted semi-structured interviews with 81
white middle-class New Zealanders who were drawn from voluntary groups and clubs and from
three secondary schools. Most of the interviews were one-on-one; two were group interviews.
The interviews covered a set of topics related to New Zealand-specific racial issues. These topics
were introduced in different ways and different times depending on the flow of conversation in
interviews.
The analysis of the interviews focused on how the participants used language to justify their
stances on race issues. For example, the researchers examined how informants’ ways of talking
made certain social groups (usually Maori people or recent immigrants) appear less than worthy
of being regarded as full citizens of the country. The researchers observed that although the
participants used neutral expressions to talk about racialized persons, they often used these
expressions in ways that were implicitly negative; such implicit evaluations then justified overtly
racist statements. The mode of analysis that Wetherell and Potter used is a discursive approach.
Such approaches investigate what talk accomplishes in a social situation rather than asking what
talk might reveal about the speaker’s inner psychological reality.
The fourth example is drawn from the research program of Larry Davidson, an American clinical
psychologist with a long-standing concern for individuals with severe and chronic mental
disorders. How, Davidson (2003) asked, can such people be supported to live satisfying lives? As
Davidson and his research team observed, such individuals often cycled in and out of inpatient
settings. In a series of studies carried out in the late 1990s, the research team sought to gain
insight into the ways that individuals with such disorders understood and experienced the
“revolving door” of care.
Davidson called his research approach empirical phenomenology, the goal of which is to
“generate subjective forms of knowledge about experiencing subjects who appear to be embedded
within a network of meaningful relationships” (2003, p. 18). Davidson and his research team
enlisted individuals who suffered from severe mental illnesses and who had experienced repeated
hospitalizations. The team carried out semi-structured interviews with these individuals, asking
them to recall their most recent hospitalization and then describe as fully as they could the
experiences that led up to it, what happened while they were hospitalized, and what happened
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subsequently. The close attention to the individuals’ lived experiences provided novel and
important insights. The research team learned that these individuals had little desire to avoid
rehospitalization. Rather, life in the hospital had several features that were highly desirable—
safety, privacy, meals, and a place of rest. The researchers also learned about the severe
deprivations of life outside the hospital, such as isolation, lack of engagement in the community,
and lack of support from their families.
The last example is drawn from the research program of Peggy Miller, a cultural psychologist
who has studied the ethnotheories (that is, culture-specific belief systems) that guide the ways
parents raise their children. Miller and her collaborators conducted a study of children’s selfesteem—a quality that has been widely extolled by parents and childcare experts in the United
States (Miller, Wang, Sandel, & Cho, 2002). The researchers compared caregivers in the United
States (typically, mothers) and in Taiwan (typically, mothers or grandmothers). In conversational
interviews with the caregivers (who were caring for 3-year-old children), the researchers
pursued topics such as child-rearing goals and values, modes of discipline, and ways of
promoting children’s development. Close readings of the interviews enabled the researchers to
compare and contrast the views expressed by the caregivers in the two societies. As the
researchers anticipated, mothers in the United States placed a high priority on fostering their
children’s self-esteem. By contrast, caregivers in Taiwan regarded high self-esteem as a
detrimental quality, anticipating that it would lead children to be disrespectful, disobedient, and
easily frustrated in the face of difficulty.
What has this brief set of examples illustrated? Perhaps most important is that psychologists
have devised and put into use a wide variety of qualitative approaches. Such approaches have been
used throughout the history of the discipline, and researchers have used them to study a
multiplicity of topics and issues. What is common to all the projects is the researchers’ stance
toward their objects of study. Their interests lie in understanding how the people whom they
study make sense of themselves and the world around them and how that sense-making shapes
their actions and choices. None of the researchers elected to measure the traits, beliefs, or
abilities of the people whom they studied; in that regard, their way of doing psychology bucked
the conventional wisdom of the discipline.

The Early History of Psychology’s Engagements With Qualitative Inquiry
Qualitative inquiry has always been a means of carrying out empirical research in psychology.
Nonetheless, there has been more contention in psychology regarding qualitative inquiry than in
other social sciences, such as sociology, anthropology, educational studies, and political science.
This has been particularly true in the United States, but there has been opposition to qualitative
inquiry in psychologies of other regions of the world as well. As a result, qualitative inquiry has
developed more slowly in psychology than in other social sciences. Although the visibility of
qualitative inquiry in psychology has increased markedly since the beginning of the 21st century,
it remains marginal to the discipline. For instance, qualitative methods are seldom taught as part
of the standard methods curriculum, and students are often warned against (and sometimes
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outright prohibited from) pursuing empirical projects based in qualitative research methods. Did
qualitative inquiry always have such a precarious status in psychology? No. A look at the origins
of academic psychology reveals a time when this was not the case.
The section “Qualitative Inquiry: Diverse Projects and Diverse Modes of Inquiry” opened with a
description of the qualitative inquiry that William James carried out around the turn of the 19th
century. Wilhelm Wundt is another example of an early psychologist who embraced qualitative
inquiry. Wundt, who was a professor at the University of Leipzig, was trained as a physician and
philosopher. Wundt was the first person to label himself as a psychologist and he is usually
identified as a founder of empirically based psychology. In 1879, Wundt established a laboratory
that was dedicated to studying elemental psychological functions, such as sensory experiences.
Concurrently, Wundt established another research program devoted to studying what he called
Völkerpsychologie. Wundt viewed Völkerpsychologie, which might be translated as ethnopsychology
or cultural psychology, as a Geisteswissenschaft (a human science akin to philosophy, linguistics,
and literary studies), which demanded a repertoire of research methods entirely different from
those used in natural science (Wertz, 2014). These methods involved the compilation and analysis
of such evidence as language, works of art, accounts of social practices in earlier societies, and
historical accounts. Wundt completed 10 volumes of Völkerpsychologie between 1900 and 1920, but
this work is largely unknown today. A third example is the German psychologist William Stern,
who was active in Hamburg from the early 1900s to the early 1930s. Together with his wife Clara
Josephy Stern, Stern kept extensive journals in which he systematically documented the growth
and development of their three children. Stern drew on this material to write a number of books
on child psychology. In the words of a historian of psychology, Stern was “a steadfast proponent
of qualitative methods, and he repeatedly issued warnings about and criticisms of investigators’
widespread neglect of such methods in favor of the quantitative tools” (Lamiell, 2019, p. 67).
The willingness to accommodate diverse methods of conducting research did not, unfortunately,
persist for very long. How did psychologists’ investigative options narrow so quickly? To answer
this question, one must examine the early context of qualitative inquiry in psychology. That is,
the history of qualitative inquiry in psychology is best understood in conjunction with the history
of quantitative inquiry. This is so because the early ascendancy of quantitative approaches to
psychological study severely curtailed the institutional space available for qualitative approaches.
Systematic empirical investigations of psychological questions began in earnest in the middle of
the 19th century. In those days, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were acknowledged
as valid forms of psychological inquiry. However, at the end of the 19th century and even more so
throughout the first half of the 20th century, quantitative approaches came to be seen as the only
properly scientific ones, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. This shift in
methodological norms played a central role in suppressing qualitative inquiry in psychology.
In what follows, we trace the early origins of psychology from the mid-1700s to the
establishment of what some historians of science have called the “quantitative imperative,” that
is, the demand that psychological researchers rely on quantitative methods (Michell, 1990). The
story begins at the time of the scientific revolution.
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Early Natural Science and the Quantity Objection
During the scientific revolution of the 17th century, natural scientists rejected the Aristotelian
view that the natural world had both qualitative and quantitative features. A consensus took
shape that the natural world consisted solely of matter and that all matter had a quantitative
structure. Mental phenomena, by contrast, were regarded as nonmaterial. It followed, therefore,
that mental phenomena were nonquantitative and that they had no existence independent of the
knower. As a result, efforts to study the mind (that is, to do psychology) in this era and to
formulate psychological laws were couched in nonquantitative terms. If scholars attempted to
formulate quantitative laws regarding mental phenomena, their attempts were countered by
what came to be called the “quantity objection.”
In essence, the quantity objection held that in order for quantification and measurement to be
possible, what was to be studied must have quantitative characteristics. Its proponents asserted
that this requirement was seldom (if ever) true of psychological attributes. If it were true that
psychological attributes are nonmaterial and therefore do not have quantitative characteristics, it
followed that quantitative methods could not be applied to them.
The quantity objection—that is, the view that using quantitative methods was not possible in
psychological research—was widely accepted throughout most of the 19th century. Inquiry into
psychological phenomena therefore remained largely nonquantitative. For example, William
James, whose study of religious experiences was described earlier, argued that human perception
was of a nonquantitative character and, further, that there was no direct quantitative relationship
between the strength of an external stimulus and its perceptual impact. In an oft-repeated quote,
James said, “To introspection, our feeling of pink is surely not a portion of our feeling of scarlet;
nor does the light of an electric arc seem to contain that of a tallow-candle in itself” (James, 1890,
p. 546).
Informed by measurement theory, scientists who championed the quantity objection demanded
that researchers who wanted to measure psychological attributes first provide empirical proof
that such attributes did in fact possess quantitative characteristics. This turned out to be an
impossible demand to meet. But remarkably, within a few decades, the quantity objection came to
be disregarded. The fledgling field of psychology became for the most part a quantitative
discipline. How and why did this transformation come about?

From the Quantity Objection to the Quantitative Imperative
By the 1920s, the reigning view of psychology in the United States and the United Kingdom was
that it was a quantitative discipline. In part, this view was promulgated to buttress the claim that
psychology was a bona fide science. How could psychology claim to be a science if it did not rely
on numbers? Historians of science have coined the expression “the quantitative imperative” for
the demand that a discipline employ measurement as its vehicle of study if it is to be regarded as a
science (Michell, 1990; Tafreshi, Slaney, & Neufeld, 2016). Consider these statements from
leading psychology researchers of the late 1800s:
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… until the phenomena of any branch of knowledge have been submitted to measurement
and number, it cannot assume the status and dignity of a science. (Galton, 1879, p. 147,
quoted in Michell, 1999)
The history of science is the history of measurement. Those departments of knowledge in
which measurement could be used most readily were the first to become sciences, and
those sciences are at the present time the furthest advanced in which measurement is the
most extended and exact.
(Cattell, 1893, p. 316, quoted in Michell, 1999)

As the historian of science Joel Michell put it, “The founding fathers of modern psychology,
almost to a man, simply presumed that measurement was a scientific imperative and,
accordingly, thought to contrive quantification” (Michell, 1999, p. 3).
To sum up: The use of quantitative measurement was imperative if the fledgling field of
psychology was to be recognized as a science. But in order to be measurable, the phenomenon
under study must have a quantitative structure. However, the scientific community at the turn of
the 19th century had registered considerable doubt that psychological phenomena had a
quantitative structure. How was it then that, by 1930, there was near-unanimity on this point
among psychologists, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States? The explanation
for this rapid embrace of the idea that human psychology was quantitative (or at least
quantifiable) can be found by considering the intellectual context of that era.
That intellectual context was set in place by the natural sciences (i.e., physics, chemistry,
astronomy, and biology). Since the beginning of the 19th century, these fields had registered
remarkable progress and therefore had come to be taken as models for what a science should be.
It is hardly surprising that psychologists would aspire to model their field after the natural
sciences. The salient features of the natural sciences were quantification and measurement.
Indeed, it had been widely argued that scientific progress was synonymous with discovering new
elements in nature and developing increasingly accurate methods for measuring those elements.
Not surprisingly, many of the early psychologists believed that measurement and quantification
were necessary for scientific progress in their discipline. How could psychologists rebut the
quantity objection (that is, the long-standing view of philosophers that psychological
phenomena were not quantitative)? To this end, the thinking of the German psychophysicist
Gustav Fechner, who had been active in the latter half of the 19th century, proved invaluable. In
an explicitly materialist formulation, Fechner had argued that the mind and the body are the
same substance. What differed, according to Fechner, was merely the perspective one takes on
that substance—physical or mental. The body, as a material part of nature, has a quantitative
structure; the mind, therefore, must also have a quantitative structure. If that were so, the mind
could be measured. Fechner’s line of reasoning, together with his development of psychophysical
methods for measuring sensory and perceptual impressions, convinced many—though not all—
psychologists that psychological phenomena could readily be quantified (Michell, 1999). Indeed,
by the 1940s, most academic psychologists in Western countries took it as self-evident that
psychological attributes were measurable. It also seemed self-evident that the only way for
psychology to be a science was for it to embrace quantitative measurement.
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Were Psychologists Right to Heed the Quantitative Imperative?
For the most part, academic psychologists today accept the quantitative imperative for scientific
psychology. However, many thinkers inside and outside psychology have registered objections.
Some, for example, have taken issue with psychologists’ assertion that psychological attributes
are quantitative. Consider Gail Hornstein’s assessment:
The basic question that first emerged at the time of the quantity objection still remains
with us today: Does it make sense to say that psychological phenomena vary along
quantitative dimensions? On the methodological level, the issue has been decided, in that
quantitative methods have become the established methods of the discipline. But on the
theoretical level, the debates continue, which means that the rationale for the adoption of
quantitative methods has yet to be clearly established.
(Hornstein, 1987, p. 17)

Further, some measurement theorists have pointed out that many of psychologists’ arguments
for quantification misconstrue or misrepresent what true measurement actually entails (Michell,
1999). Others have taken a step further back to rebut the notion that psychological inquiry cannot
be scientific unless it makes use of numbers, measurements, and statistics (Michell, 2003;
Tafreshi, Slaney, & Neufeld, 2016).
Psychologists’ reliance on measurement presupposed that psychological phenomena were
quantitative. Inevitably, this reliance produced a corpus of research results that appeared to
confirm this presupposition (Danziger, 1985). There were additional consequences that bore
directly on the status of qualitative inquiry in psychology. The use of measurement and statistics
became a central element of the disciplinary identity of psychology, as well as the routine way to
conduct psychological research. For many psychologists, other ways of doing research were
rejected out of hand, simply because they were not the standard practice. Many historians of
psychology and philosophers of science have observed and criticized this pattern, referring to it
with scathing epithets, such as method-fetishism, methodolatry, and physics-envy. Furthermore,
the automatic rejection of nonquantitative methods closed down possibilities for faculty
members in many psychology departments to pursue qualitative inquiry or to teach their
students about qualitative methods. In the United States, standard textbooks on psychological
research methods typically have excluded mention of qualitative approaches. Moreover, scientific
papers based on qualitative approaches were (and in some cases continue to be) embargoed by
many psychology journals.
A further effect of the quantitative imperative is that it led psychologists to rule out many aspects
of human experience and social life as objects of study, deeming them to be “not psychology” or
not amenable to scientific study. William James’s study of religious experiences, for example, was
viciously condemned by some of his successors in the Harvard psychology department. Although
The Varieties of Religious Experience is still read by scholars and students in religious studies, few
psychologists know of it and even fewer have read it. John Dollard’s study of race relations,
although it was reprinted numerous times, is largely unknown to psychologists and psychology
students. But the fate of qualitative inquiry has not been entirely bleak. Although the quantitative
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imperative played a powerful role in shaping the discipline of psychology throughout much of the
20th century, it did not expunge entirely other forms of psychological inquiry. In certain subfields
of the discipline, qualitative approaches have continued to be put into use as means of producing
scientific knowledge. These subfields include clinical and counseling psychology and the broad
area of psychology that encompasses personality theory, personology, and the study of lives. The
latter is the topic of the next section.

The Study of Lives
The study of lives is the term for a varied set of research initiatives in psychology, spanning the
1930s to the present. Over this period, researchers have drawn on a number of theoretical
frameworks, including psychodynamic theories, narrative psychology, life history methods, and
psychobiography. They have drawn on many sources of information, including letters, diaries,
narrative interviews, projective measures, and clinical case studies. What unites these initiatives
is the shared aim of devising accounts of people that attend to their self-understanding, their
ways of making sense of the world, the choices they make, and the actions consequent on those
choices.
In the 1930s, Harvard University was an important site for such work (which its proponents called
the study of persons, or personology). Three notable psychologists, Gordon Allport, Robert W.
White, and Henry Murray, were the leading figures in this endeavor. All three were engaged in
research practices aimed at developing holistic accounts of persons, although their emphases
differed. None of them put stock in measuring discrete traits, motives, or abilities, which was the
standard practice of psychologists of the time. A brief look at the scholarly biographies and
intellectual commitments of these men may help us understand why they departed from the
disciplinary orthodoxy of the time.
Gordon Allport completed his PhD in psychology at Harvard University in 1922 and then spent
two years studying under psychologists in Europe. As Hevern’s (2019) rich account of Allport’s
scholarly career underscores, Allport’s European sojourn was pivotal in his intellectual
development. A good deal of his time was spent with William Stern (whose work was described
above). From Stern, Allport learned about the case study method; he came to prize the “frankly
intuitive and interpretive methods of the German Geisteswissenschaften” (Allport, 1932, p. 344,
quoted in Hevern, 2019). When he returned to Harvard to take up a faculty position in the
psychology department, he found himself “out of touch and out of step with the Anglo-American
traditions of positivism, statistics, and objectivism” (Allport, quoted in Hevern, 2019, p. 83). He
placed a high value on the individual, holding that each person had a unique and enduring
configuration of qualities and moral values. To Allport’s way of thinking, respect for such
individual uniqueness was consonant with the ethos of democracy. By contrast, he viewed the
reliance on statistical averages and on what he termed mass methods of research as inimical to
democratic ideals. Allport’s concerns, of course, were heightened by the rise of totalitarianism
and fascism in Europe at that time. Indeed, in the early 1940s, at the behest of the prestigious
Social Science Research Council, he undertook a comprehensive survey of the use of personal
documents in psychology (Allport, 1942).
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Robert W. White took up a position in the Harvard psychology department in 1937. White
originally trained to be a historian, but he took a second doctoral degree in psychology. Like
Allport, White sought to develop holistic accounts of persons. His interests included both normal
personality and what he called the abnormal personality. White strove to understand the process
of psychological growth as individuals moved through the life course. His book Lives in Progress: A
Study of the Natural Growth of Personality (1952), for instance, offers detailed portraits of three
individuals when they were college students and then 10 years later. White’s interests extended
beyond personality theory to clinical psychology. An important undertaking was his effort to
describe abnormal or deviant individuals using the theories and concepts derived from the study
of normal personality to replace the language of psychopathology. His textbook The Abnormal
Personality, which was first published in 1946 and has been updated and re-issued many times,
served as the standard textbook for college courses in abnormal psychology in the United States.
Henry Murray, who had originally trained to be a physician, endeavored to bring psychoanalytic
thought into the academic study of psychology at Harvard. Murray had undergone psychoanalysis
with Jung and was deeply impressed by Jungian ideas. Murray viewed individuals as having
distinctive sets of needs; these needs were often kept out of consciousness. During the 1930s,
Murray, in collaboration with Christiana Morgan, devised the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT).
The TAT comprises twenty ambiguous drawings; respondents are instructed to compose a story
about each drawing. The TAT was used for personality research and as one element in
psychodynamically oriented clinical assessments for the next several decades. Murray wrote
Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of Fifty Men of College Age (1938).
These three psychologists diverged sharply from the other members of the Harvard psychology
department regarding their views of the proper object of study for psychology, the proper
practices of psychological research, and even the ultimate goals of psychological inquiry. The
disagreements were so deep and so persistent that by the early 1940s, Allport, White, and Murray
began to seek ways to leave the department. They joined hands with a group of sociologists and
anthropologists who were interested in possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration. In 1946,
Harvard permitted this group to form a new academic department, which offered both graduate
and undergraduate courses of study. The department was called the Department of Social
Relations. SocRel, as it came to be known on the Harvard campus and in American academia more
generally, continued to function until the late 1970s. The roster of scholars affiliated with SocRel
as either faculty members or students is studded with eminent social scientists who embraced
qualitative approaches, including in-depth interviewing, ethnographic fieldwork, the study of
narratives, psychobiographical methods, and case studies. Several of these researchers were
psychologists, many of whom went on to develop academic institutes or units in other
universities that fostered qualitative inquiry in psychology.
To sum up: In what ways did the experiences of Allport, White, and Murray typify those of
qualitative psychologists in the United States at the time? The pattern of exclusion and discord
was not unique to Harvard. Psychologists committed to nonquantitative methods of inquiry and
to the study of the whole person often found it difficult to make a home in conventional
psychology departments. As did Allport, Murray, and White, many found more hospitable
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academic venues outside psychology departments. These venues included programs in
educational studies, family studies, human development, social welfare, communications,
community medicine, public health, industrial-organizational studies, and gender studies.
What conceptual building blocks did the early personality psychologists contribute to qualitative
inquiry? Perhaps the overarching contribution was a humanistic stance that imbued persons with
the capacity for self-knowledge, for exercising choice over the course of their lives, and for
choosing actions consonant with their goals and values. This stance was embodied in several
premises about how best to pursue knowledge about persons. One such premise was that
researchers should consider persons as embedded in relationships and in societal and historical
contexts. It also included longitudinal studies of how people develop and change. Another set of
enduring principles concerns approaches to research. The early personality psychologists
regarded people’s own construals of their lives as legitimate and valuable sources of information.
Moreover, they did not feel it necessary to subject every research participant to identical
procedures of gathering data. In addition, they valued and sought out opportunities to collaborate
with anthropologists and sociologists.
The study of lives has proceeded since the days of Allport, Murray, and White. The range of
research questions has expanded and new theoretical perspectives have been brought to bear on
those questions. For example, many researchers now incorporate ideas about the role of narrative
in the construction of life stories and personal identity. Other researchers have investigated the
culture-specific frameworks or “story lines” within which individual lives are emplotted. Others
have traced connections between societal trauma (such as the internment of Japanese American
citizens during World War II or the Cambodian genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge regime)
and personality development. Some have carried out long-term studies that explore the
consequences of historical events (such as the civil rights movement in the United States) on
long-term value commitments. In addition, concerns for social justice have prompted many
psychologists to undertake studies about the lives and experiences of people who are members of
racialized and otherwise marginalized groups.

The 1970s: Qualitative Inquiry Comes of Age
The 1970s ushered in a time of tumult and crisis, both in society and in psychology. The United
States and Europe were rocked by youth protests, antiwar activism, and social movements for
gender equality and civil rights. In psychology, the reigning paradigms of behaviorism and
psychoanalysis had run their course. Feminists inside and outside the field challenged any
number of assertions made by psychologists about women’s capabilities, desires, and needs. They
charged that psychologists’ portrayal of women as inferior and servile merely served to cloak
social ideology with a veneer of science. Such challenges to scientific objectivity led inexorably to
critiques of customary research practices. Around the same time, scholars like Harré and Secord
(1972), Gergen (1973), Giorgi (1970), and Koch (1969) put forward incisive epistemological
critiques of the field.
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It seems likely that this unrest and discontent played a part in opening the way for some
researchers to entertain radically new forms of inquiry. In any event, psychologists introduced a
variety of new approaches to qualitative inquiry in the next two decades. In 1970, for example, the
American psychologist Amedeo Giorgi introduced a method of phenomenological analysis based
on the writings of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. In the mid-1980s, a group of British psychologists
published Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity, a critical treatise
based the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Foucault (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, &
Walkerdine, 1984). In the United States, Gergen (1985), Hare-Mustin and Marecek (1988), and
others brought forward social constructionist ideas regarding the power of language (and thereby
the sociocultural context that provided linguistic resources) in shaping what appeared to be
reality. A group of Canadian psychologists specializing in psychotherapy research (Rennie,
Phillips, & Quartaro, 1988) introduced grounded theory, a method borrowed from qualitative
sociology. At Loughborough University in the United Kingdom, a group of social psychologists
who named themselves DARG (the Discourse And Rhetoric Group) put forward a radical challenge
to conventional social psychology. These initiatives brought an array of new nonquantitative
investigative practices into psychology. Equally important, they extended the use of qualitative
methods well beyond the study of personality to the study of a broad array of social processes and
social relations.
Two lines of philosophical thought that developed in the late 19th century formed a basis for
some qualitative methods: hermeneutics and phenomenology. Hermeneutics refers to the
tradition of textual interpretation that originated in Scripture interpretation. The German
philosopher-psychologist Wilhelm Dilthey, writing at the end of the 19th century, drew on
hermeneutics to plead for an interpretative approach to human psychology. In Dilthey’s words,
“We explain nature, we understand psychic life” (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 27). For Dilthey,
understanding (Verstehen) was a distinct alternative to the generalizations put forward by
psychologists who embraced the natural science model (Jovanovic, 2011). Hermeneutics and the
ensuing development of interpretative thinking are core to qualitative inquiry.
For philosophers, the term phenomenology has both a general sense and a narrower philosophical
sense. In its general sense, phenomenology covers the general study of phenomena, that is, the
study of the world as it appears to an experiencing person. In its philosophical sense,
phenomenology refers to a specific line of thought that was introduced by the German
philosopher Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century. During the 20th century,
philosophers like Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Hans-Georg
Gadamer contributed to phenomenological philosophy. The thinking and writing of these
philosophers served as the foundation for two prominent qualitative methods in psychology, one
used widely in the United States and the other used widely in the United Kingdom.
In the United States, Amedeo Giorgi established an approach to psychology that was grounded on
principles of phenomenology. With Adrian van Kamm, Giorgi founded the “Duquesne School” of
psychology at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in the 1960s. The psychology
department at Duquesne University has continued to serve as a center for the development of
theory, research, and clinical practice grounded in principles of phenomenology. Giorgi
formalized his empirical-phenomenological research method in two influential books, Psychology
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as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach (1970) and The Descriptive
Phenomenological Method in Psychology: A Modified Husserlian Approach (2009). In the United
Kingdom, interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was put forward in the 1990s by three
psychologists, Jonathan Smith, Michael Larkin, and Paul Flowers (2009). In keeping with its
roots in phenomenological philosophy, IPA provides a method for studying the lived experience
of a particular person in a specific context. Psychologists have used IPA to study a wide variety of
topics, but it has been especially useful for health psychologists.
In sociology, a generative influence on qualitative methods has been symbolic interactionism,
which was developed by Herbert Blumer during the 1950s and 1960s. Symbolic interactionism
focused researchers’ attention on how individuals interact with one another to create symbolic
worlds and, reciprocally, how these worlds shape individual behaviors. Symbolic interactionism
begins from the premise that people’s actions toward things are determined by the meanings
those things hold for them; these meanings arise out of (and are continually modified by) the
actor’s social interactions. If meanings come into being through social interactions, then
sociological inquiry must attend closely to people’s lived experiences. One such approach, put
forward by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967), was called grounded theory. A central tenet
of the grounded theory approach is that research projects must begin with careful and systematic
observations; theory development must be grounded in those observations and proceed
inductively. Some qualitative approaches in psychology have utilized concepts and procedures
drawn from grounded theory. One such approach is consensual qualitative research (CQR),
developed by Hill, Thompson, and Williams (1997). Another is the approach developed by Rennie
and his colleagues. Both these approaches have been used extensively in the study of client–
therapist interactions.
The “turn to language” is a fourth intellectual movement that has figured significantly in current
developments in qualitative inquiry in psychology. The turn to language was a broad movement
in the academy to focus attention on the role and function of language in producing and
warranting knowledge. This focus of attention, which originated among philosophers in the early
20th century, encompassed an array of topics and debates about language, language users, the
relation between language and knowing, and questions about the power of language as a medium
of social regulation. Among the philosophers who took up such questions were Wittgenstein,
Quine, Foucault, Derrida, and Austin. By the 1970s, disciplines like history, literary studies,
sociology, and anthropology had become sites of intense (and often contentious) debates about
the new ways of thinking associated with the turn to language.
Central to debates about language was the concept of discourse, defined by the French philosopher
Michel Foucault as “the practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak” (1969,
p. 49). Foucauldian theorists paid particular attention to dominant discourses—those that serve
to maintain the status quo, including relations of power. Foucault coined the term pouvoir/savoir
(power/knowledge) to indicate that structures of power are held in place by discursive formations
that are accepted as true. At the same time, those in powerful positions confer legitimacy on those
discursive formations. Foucault proposed what he called genealogical investigations to track the
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historical emergence of dominant discursive formations. Also in the 1960s, Berger and
Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (1966), an important contribution to the sociology
of knowledge, similarly argued that what is taken to be reality is a matter of social consensus.
By the 1980s, some psychologists took up lines of investigation about discourses and the
constitutive power of language. The works by Henriques and his colleagues (1984) and Gergen
(1985) created considerable interest and spurred new lines of research. One line of theorizing
drew upon Foucault’s ideas to develop a qualitative approach called discourse analysis. Discourse
analysis seeks to uncover culturally shared ways of understanding a particular phenomenon.
Typically, the goal is to locate dominant discourses—those that are taken as “common sense”
and self-evidently true (Burman & Parker, 1993). For example, a number of feminist researchers
have traced dominant discourses about heterosexual sexual relations (such as the discourse of an
implacable male sex drive) that privileged men’s pleasure and sometimes served to justify
coercing female partners (Hollway, 1984). In the years since the 1980s, a number of variations
and extensions of discourse analysis have been developed. This family of approaches has proven
particularly useful for investigations by critical psychologists. These approaches have been taken
up by psychologists in many parts of the world.
The turn to language gave rise to a second line of psychological theory and research—discursive
psychology. The DARG took an early lead in developing discursive psychology. Discursive
psychology is the study of the details of talk and other language practices that are the central part
of everyday social interactions. Core to discursive psychology is John L. Austin’s concept of
performative utterances. That is, discursive psychologists hold that talk is not only a vehicle for
conveying inner thoughts to others. It is also (and more so) a means of carrying out social actions.
In other words, it is by means of discursive practices that people “accomplish themselves” in
interactions with one another (Edwards & Potter, 1992).

In Conclusion: A Look to the Future
Psychologists who espouse qualitative approaches have developed several ways to foster such
approaches and to promote knowledge about them among psychologists. As of 2020, three
professional associations of psychologists engaged in qualitative inquiry have been formed: the
Qualitative Methods in Psychology Section (QMIP) in the United Kingdom, the Society for
Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology (SQIP) in the United States, and the Association of European
Qualitative Researchers in Psychology (EQuiP). These organizations promote qualitative inquiry
in many ways. Their conferences provide forums for sharing research findings and for the
exchange of ideas. The conferences also serve as a means by which students can learn about
qualitative research; in that way, they serve to fill what has been, and in many cases continues to
be, a void in the academic curriculum in most psychology departments.
Psychologists who have embraced qualitative approaches have also shouldered the task of
promoting knowledge about such approaches to the field of psychology more broadly. In the early
1990s, they successfully petitioned the British Psychological Society to endorse a requirement for
academic training in qualitative research methods. Consequently, beginning in the mid-1990s,
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first in the United Kingdom and later in other European countries and the United States,
textbooks on qualitative methods in psychology have appeared. A number of elective
undergraduate and postgraduate courses also came into being, particularly in the United
Kingdom. Since then, training in qualitative methods has become a part of the methods
curriculum in an increasing number of psychology departments. However, as of 2020, most
university programs in psychology do not offer such training.
Today, several psychology journals publish qualitative research. Qualitative Research in Psychology
(established in 2004 in the United Kingdom) and Qualitative Psychology (established in 2014 in the
United States) are exclusively dedicated to qualitative approaches and qualitative methodology.
There are other psychology journals that carry reports of research based on qualitative methods,
such as Discourse & Society and Feminism & Psychology. Another indication of the growing
recognition and visibility of qualitative methods is the inclusion of substantial material about
qualitative research in the seventh edition of the official Publication Manual of the American
Psychological Association.
As the third decade of the 21st century begins, psychologists are bringing forward new ideas about
qualitative inquiry. Some involve the use of digital technologies to gather data. For example, some
have used the video capabilities of cell phone cameras to devise new versions of the photoelicitation method. Some are experimenting with event sampling and data collection via text
messaging. Some have uncovered new or previously available sources of data. For example,
digitization has made archival collections of historical documents, letters, personal records, and
images from around the world newly available to researchers. Other researchers have developed
participatory research methods that bring research participants into all phases of their research
projects. Still others are experimenting with so-called mixed methods and are seeking ways to
integrate findings produced by qualitative methods and quantitative methods within one
research project.
Looking back, it is apparent that, despite a slow beginning and early skepticism, considerable
numbers of psychologists have joined the ranks of qualitative researchers. In so doing, they are
expanding the range of methodological options in the discipline.
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